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The Arrogation of Being: Revisiting the
Anthropology of Religion
E. Valentine Daniel

I

wish to begin this essay by performing a Christian act. I wish to
make a confession. After almost twenty years of meditating on the subject, I have come to the conclusion that religion is not a human universal. It never was. In this rapidly globalizing world it might someday
become one, but it isn’t one yet. I want to go even further and propose
that religion is, by and large, a Christian affair (and possibly, to a lesser
extent, an Islamic and Jewish affair) which has been, over the centuries, attributed by Christians to all the peoples of the world. It has
been at best an act of courtesy and at worst an act of innocent arrogance. Given the way global power relations have worked over the
past thousand years, the “conquered” in their turn have clamored to
prove that they too, not just the conquerors, have “religion.” With massive help from Orientalists, Indologists, scholars of comparative religion, and anthropologists, the West and the Westernized have come to
hold the belief that, despite evidence to the contrary, all the peoples of
the world have religion. I can instantly see a number of my friends
jumping to their feet to demand of me my definition of religion. How
could I possibly say that something is not universal without defining
what that something is? My answer, my friends, is this: defining religion is your problem, not mine. But I can point you to the graveyard
filled with the bones of a multitude of past definitions of religion and
assure you that sooner or later yours, too, will end up there, with or
without my effort. A tediously magnificent study of the fate of those
definitions and theories that assumed religion’s universality is the
recent book by S. N. Balagangadhara, The Heathen in His Blindness. The
pioneering work on the universality of religion with a definitional
focus was the much-debated book of Cantwell Smith. But definition is
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not my primary concern in this essay. Balagangadhara’s own study,
though not definitional in focus, is an extended argument on the place
of religion and its constituting regnancy in “Western culture.” And the
argument is logico-philosophical in nature. I wish to trace the gradients of power in the growth of religion and its consequences for those
societies and cultures in which religion was an awkward foreign
implant but with far-reaching consequences for the host cultures and
societies.
What is most illuminating in the work of some of those students
from the West who have struggled with the question of the universality of religion can be found in those moments of candor that flash
somewhere early on in their inquiry when they declare, with different
degrees of despair but with undeniable clarity of insight, that the culture or people they are studying do not have religion. Unfortunately,
very few stop there but instead lose that clarity as they try to expand
their definition of religion to capture more and more of the uncapturable in a cloud of definitional smoke. The “other” is transformed
into “another” of the same. And, it is assumed, since the same has religion, so must the other. But this another ends up being only a highly
qualified and equivocated version of the prototype, a mere reflection
of the “original” on troubled waters. And where is this prototype to be
found? Balagangadhara locates it in Christianity, a prototype to which
Islam and Judaism may measure up, but certainly none of the so-called
religions of Asia, Africa, or the Amerindians do. He argues that what is
common to all three Semitic religions is the centrality they accord to
“belief” in their self-definition. I am not as familiar with Islam or
Judaism, but I am familiar enough with Christianity to know that a
non-believing Christian would be an oxymoron of the first order. The
converse is best illustrated by an example. Just before my father was to
marry my mother, and willing to become a Christian for the love of
her, he had an appointment with the missionary who was to facilitate
the transformation. The first question the missionary asked him was:
“Do you believe in Shiva?” As long as my father lived, he recalled this
as being one of the strangest questions anyone ever asked of him. He
acknowledged Shiva. He knew stories about him. But believe? That
was a strange concept indeed to apply to Shiva! He lived among the
manifestations of Shiva. My father lived the rest of his life as a Christian; possibly coming to “believe” in Jesus; but Shiva or Vishnu or
Rama was not someone to believe in. That is not how an Indian relates
to these powerful beings.
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I wish to ponder the question of religion and belief further by considering their place in two traditions: in what has come to be called
Hinduism and Buddhism. I have not forgotten the “global moment”
which we have been charged to reflect upon. Let me do so via a detour
through anthropologyland in the specific cases of Hinduism and the
history of Sri Lankan Buddhism.
I. “Hindu” “Ritual”
Addressing Hinduism first and staking my claim as an ethnographer,
allow me to introduce you to two ethnographic events. Both, to distinctly different degrees, partook of three ontological modes. These
three modes I shall term mood, moment, and mind — a triad on which
I have elaborated elsewhere and I will but summarily touch upon here
in order to facilitate a better understanding of the role and place of
belief in Christianity, a religion if ever there was one.1
The two events I have in mind are weddings. If pressed, I may even
concede that they were “Hindu” weddings, making sure to remind
you that I place “Hindu” between quotes. The first took place in 1974
in a village in South India. It belonged to a type of wedding that I was
to witness and study more than fifty times over the following two
years, in villages, cities, and towns all over South India. This (type of)
wedding was traditional and local. The second occurred in a chateau
nouveau in New Jersey in 1999. It was religionish and global. (I know,
“religionish” is a fishy word, hardly English. My point, exactly.) There
were many things common to both weddings. Both had rituals performed before a fire in which the officiating Brahmin, the bride and
groom, and one or more of the couple’s relatives participated; during
both rituals the Brahmin recited appropriate mantras from Sanskrit
texts; and both weddings were such that the men were strong, the
women good looking, and the children above average. Correction! In
the 1974 wedding, children were ubiquitous, everywhere and in place.
In the 1999 wedding, children were few in number, in their places but
out of place. Common, of course, to both weddings was the presence
of the same anthropologist (same, except in the second, twenty-five
years older and arguably a little wiser, but certainly far less earnest).
The differences between the two weddings were as many as were
the similarities. That one was a Tamil wedding and the other a Punjabi
wedding is not of much import. It is germane, however, that during
the Punjabi wedding in 1999, the priest and several members of the
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audience reminded us that this was a wedding in the Hindu religious
tradition. Whereas in 1974 either no one thought to mention such a fact
or else it was not a wedding in the Hindu religious tradition after all. In
fact, the fifty-odd weddings I had attended between 1974 and 1976 in
South India were identified by Tamils as Brahmin, Vellalah, Gaunda,
Parayar, or by numerous other jati (or “caste”) names, and also as
either Christian or Muslim — as if these too were jatis. But never was a
wedding I attended identified as Hindu. Let me add parenthetically,
however, that only Christian weddings were marked by the fact that
they took place in a “house of worship” called a church. The Christians
saw the church as a sacred place and distinguished it from the place
where the wedding feast would be held. The latter was a non-sacred
place. The feasts at the Tamil weddings were 100 percent vegetarian,
with no alcohol. The New Jersey wedding offered choices: Veg, nonVeg and, yes, Sushi — and that was only for “snacks.” A multi-course
dinner banquet was to follow with dancing and alcohol from the finest
wineries, distilleries, and breweries from all corners of the globe. But
again, this is a difference of little significance, because the food at both
weddings, though very different, was delicious. What was significant
is that the wedding feast at the New Jersey event was not considered
part of the wedding ritual or, as the mother of the bridegroom put it,
“It was not part of the sacred ritual; it was for all to enjoy.” Was this
non-sacred part secular, post-figuring a Durkheimian dichotomy? Was
the sacred part not to be “enjoyed” — whatever that meant — by all?
The division reminded me of the Christian wedding in a church with
the feast that follows being held in a space that is not the church, in
contrast to the many non-Christian weddings of South India. It is not
pertinent to my essay that the Sanskrit accent of the Brahmin at the
Punjabi was as dysphonic as the Tamil Brahmin’s was euphonic; but it
is germane that at the New Jersey wedding, the ritual specialist paused
at various points during the rituals and the recitations to provide an
exegesis of what he was saying and doing. In New Jersey, the guests
sat on chairs arranged in neat rows, almost congregation-like, and paid
keen, even if at times, bemused attention to what the officiant was saying. Had the priest in Tamil Nadu launched into an exegetical exercise
it would have either gone completely unnoticed or, more than likely,
the guests would have taken the priest to be slightly deranged. At the
wedding in New Jersey, the priest wanted the recitations and the rituals to mean something and the members of the audience expected them
to mean something; at the weddings in South India, priest and partici-
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pants considered the recitations and the rituals significant but meaningless. If you press me to hazard a characterization of these rituals, I
would have to call them, in all retrospective honesty, mindless. This is
because meaning, in the dominant Western epistemologies, has been
and remains a mental phenomenon. At least in my discipline, the
structuralists, the post-structuralists, the symbolic anthropologists,
and even the materialists would agree on this, even though they may
disagree as to which is more important, mind or matter.
During my first year of anthropological fieldwork in 1974, my
anthropologist-wife, our two research assistants, and I recorded, by all
available means, every possible detail of the ritual performed by the
officiating Brahmin. Our eyes and ears were focused, our pens and
notebooks alert and active, our cameras alive and clicking. Our aim
was to miss nothing. Except for the technology of photo taking, we
were more akin to worshippers at a prayer meeting of early Puritans
than we could have imagined possible for two self-professed atheists
or agnostics posing as scientists. There were no explicit sermons, but
(and possibly because of that) we regarded ritual as a cryptic sermon,
ready to pour forth with meaning if we could only make ourselves fit
to receive it, to understand that which was concealed in symbolic representations. We would, later, with the help of ritual specialists, scholars of Hinduism, textualists, and our own training in symbolic
anthropology, decode words and deeds and find meaning therein. Ritual, for us, was, in Evans-Pritchard’s words, “meanings imprisoned in
action.”2 Setting these meanings free was our task, our calling.
What is more, ritual actions, including ritual utterances—Durkheim
had taught us — were at the core of religion. The “elementary forms of
the religious life” were to be found in ritual. Beliefs may overtly or
covertly accompany these rituals but beliefs often hid what was at the
core, concealed what religion was really about. Durkheim never
doubted for a moment that ritual was anything but religion. He did
take beliefs (that is, native beliefs) into consideration, but on the whole
favored the view that beliefs got in the way of true understanding.
Belief was for Durkheim a matter of art and material for the artist; it
was ritual that constituted the object of scientific inquiry. It was not
that what the natives believed was unimportant or even dispensable,
but it was something that had to be sifted through so as to arrive at the
real meaning that reposed in the more foundational beliefs imprisoned
in ritual action which were to be brought to light only by the analyst.
Rituals had to be studied and analyzed for what they represented. Rit-
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ual actions were fundamentally and importantly symbolic. Had
Durkheim, then, broken free of a belief-centered understanding of religion and arrived at a more fundamental, elementary or universal
understanding and definition of religion? Hardly. There remained a
belief that vied for center stage. This was the belief (or belief system) of
the student of social science. (I include students of religion in the category of the social sciences; you may call it the human sciences, if you
prefer.) But the difference was that the belief of the social scientist
would be called theory.
The road that led from pure belief to pure theory is a long and interesting one — too long to review here except to note that it is one with
the story of Christianity. It begins in antiquity with the abstraction by a
traditionless Christianity of religio from traditio and the making of
other traditions into other “religions” (including those of the Pagans)
fit for comparison, conversion, and conquest. It is fascinating to note
the growth of this process even over the nine hundred-odd years that
separate St. Augustine from St. Thomas of Aquinas. To quote Balagangadhara:
Anyone who contrasts the City of God with the Summa Contra cannot but
be struck by the different attitudes exhibited by these two great minds of
the Catholic Church with respect to “other religions.” In the pages of
Augustine, the “religions” of the Greeks and the Romans are constantly
present. His polemics are directed against the “survivals” of the GraecoRoman cults and associations. They are living presences, constantly
reminding Christianity of an otherness, irrespective of what St. Augustine
called them and how the church looked at them. By contrast, in a work
written against the gentiles, Aquinas’ tone is abstract and distant, which
has less to do with his rational approach than with the subject matter.3

In his history of the Christian doctrine, Pelikan notes the situation as
follows:
The Summa against the Gentiles of Thomas Aquinas was written at a time
when there were certainly very few “Gentiles,” that is, pagans, left in
Western Europe and when those for whom it was ostensibly composed
could not have understood it.4

This observation, while true, masks a very important question: How
could Aquinas himself have understood what paganism was? This
(mis)understanding through the distancing of the Other has continued
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in Western scholarship to this very day. Even anthropologists who go
to “the field” never get there because they take home with them.
The Reformation marks the greatest refueling station — with fuel
and food of theretofore unrealized potency — for the onward march of
belief and believers alike. Indeed, it was there and then that belief was
securely enthroned. Max Weber’s opus, The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism, is a testament to this achievement, and so are his
other works on comparative religion, with all their insights as well as
their blind spots. Protestantism provides its believers with a way of
seeing the world. With the Enlightenment, a new religion in the image
of its prototype was born. This religion was called secularism, its
reigning deity, Reason. It, too, provided a way of seeing the world, a
theory, and an epistemology. Seeing, which ought to be but one way of
being in the world, becomes the supreme, if not the only, way of being
in the world. Theoretical knowledge insinuates itself as that form of
knowledge that will make the cosmos explanatorily intelligible. The
question, “do you believe in Jesus?” can be advanced without encountering an awkward heartbeat, into, “do you believe in science?”
My mentor, Victor Turner, was an anthropologist trained in the
Durkheimian tradition. If from Durkheim he learned the power of conscience collectif, he also learned from him the persuasive power of representation collectif. He was a Catholic turned Marxist turned Catholic
again. Even though Turner (far more than Durkheim) was receptive to
native exegesis of ritual and did not rush through it as Durkheim had
done to arrive at conscience collectif, one wonders if he could have ever
forgotten a lesson he learned from Marx — the lesson that consciousness could at times be false (and conversely, also true) and that if representations represent then they are also capable of misrepresenting.
After all, these representations were symbols, or “signs of convention.”
And if conventions reveal, they also conceal. Neither Turner nor his
students would have been so boorish as to consider native exegeses
misrepresentations or false — after all, they were post-Gadamerian
hermeneuticians — but we were trained to elevate our own theoretical
representations to a level that could only be called more general or
“higher.” With the increasing distancing of fields such as anthropology
from the conceits of the overt claims of the natural sciences, such theories may not have been christened “scientific,” but they were seen as
the end product of analytic reasoning. And thus, even though the
Gadamerian assertion that “every point of view (that of science
included) is only a point of view” was loudly professed, there was no
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getting rid of the whisper of the Diltheyan envy of and hope for a standard in the human sciences that could some day stand up to the claims
of the natural sciences. Science claimed that scientific theory made the
world explanatorily intelligible. And so did Christianity, which in one
of its most moving evangelical hymns, Amazing Grace, proclaims a
believer’s experience in the words: “I once was lost, but now I am
found, was blind but now I see.”
The very image evoked by the notion of a higher level of analysis
privileges the optic. Why would one want to rise to a higher level
except to be able to have a wider perspective, a better view? Theory
itself has its roots in the Greek: thea, which means “to see.” And what
is more, one always theorizes “about” something. “Aboutness” is basic
to theory. And “aboutness” is also basic to religion, especially Christianity. The scientist and the Christian have this one thing in common.
They are committed to a form of knowledge that has to do with
“knowing about.” And right representations are what we need if we
are to get right that which we are trying to know about. Others’ representations—in the form of beliefs or exegeses—of what they are about
are certainly invaluable, especially for ardent students of comparative
religion and anthropology. For some, like Freud and Marx, they are
invaluable because they promise to help reveal the false and the illusory. For others, such as Durkheim and Weber, they reveal something
more real than that which these representations claim to be about, such
as the nature of society or the power of ideology or the workings of
history. But even in the absence of expressed native beliefs or exegeses,
ritual actions themselves are taken as representations of something
other than themselves; they are taken to mean something. How they
mean and what they mean is what the scientist is after. Religion is an
exercise in aboutness. So is theory in science. And to those who see ritual to constitute the core of religion it must also be an exercise in
aboutness, an exercise in providing the believer a way of seeing the
world, the cosmos. If properly theorized, rituals, too, will make the
world (about which they are) explanatorily intelligible. My argument
is that this is a very Christian and, ergo, a religious notion of ritual.
In the New Jersey wedding, the priest was a theorist. He was interpreting his actions, recitations and incantations in order to provide
himself and his audience a way of seeing the world. He was performing a Hindu wedding — Hindu, as in Hindu religion. There was some
awkwardness. He had not found his stride yet, which was cause for
some levity among the members of the audience. And he knew it, too,
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and straddled the divide between exegesis and clowning and kept losing his balance. But he was almost there. The HinduISM hadn’t found
its stride either. But it, too, was almost there. It was at the brink of
arriving at the global moment, the religious moment, the Christian
moment.
If I keep repeating the word “moment,” I do so intentionally; partly
with a nod to the title of this symposium which speaks of the “Global
Moment,” and partly with a relationship of contrast which “moment”
holds to the two other elements in a triad I have already alluded to:
“mood” and “mind.” I treat this triad as a species of the philosopher
Charles S. Peirce’s phenomenological categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.5 The word “mood” connotes a state of feeling,
possibly vague and diffuse, but relatively enduring. It is a disposition
toward the world at any particular time yet with a timeless quality to
it. In the South Indian weddings, mood was of utmost importance, a
mood that was created not by the light of exegeses (or what I would
like to call theoretical knowledge) but by a state of being that was
determined by an array of practices. It was only towards the end of my
second year in the field that I realized that what was happening in a
Tamil wedding was not only what was going on around the homa kundam or fire-pit, near the Brahmins with their rituals and recitations,
and the drummers and oboe players with their music. Matters of equal
if not greater significance were taking place in acts of getting reacquainted, making alliances, looking for prospective brides and grooms
for sons and daughters, gossiping, rehearsing old prejudices and trying out new ones, testing each other’s skills and poise, status and
grace, taking measure of each other’s place in an evolving order of
things, transgressing maps of old privileges with stories of new ones.
But do all these activities have anything to do with the marriage ritual
as such? What a Christian question! It was all these activities taken
together that created the appropriate mood of the wedding that
dwarfed the moment and left very little place for mind.
At the New Jersey wedding, I did compulsively what all ethnographers do: eavesdrop, observe, note a point, follow a drift and then
question those who were willing to talk, or even those not so willing to
talk. I took the opportunity to speak with several individuals who had
either come to the United States for the sole purpose of attending this
wedding or with those who were well acquainted with weddings
(their own and others’) that they had attended in India. With hardly
any prodding, they offered their opinions and feelings about the differ-
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ences, none critical. None of the Indians, even those who were most
likely to know, found fault with the ritual, except to comment on the
novelty of the hermeneutic and exegetical exercises in which the priest
indulged. They were keen observers of a host of other differences, but
these differences seemed to amount to creating a different kind of
mood than what they might have recognized in India. One remark in
particular stood out for me; this came from a woman in her seventies.
After noting that there were far fewer helpers in America (meaning
“ritual participants”) causing what the priest was doing to appear as if
it was being done for the first time rather than an ancient rite that has
been done thousands of times before, she observed: “This is like a
school. Everything has a meaning. Very orderly. Lot of explaining.” I
asked her if the explanations were correct. She responded with a hand
gesture and eye movement indicating something between “it doesn’t
matter” to “who cares!” to “who knows?” Overall, if I were to sum up
the responses, at least with respect to the ritual aspect of the wedding,
the mood would be characterized as uncertain and unsettled, even if
not unsettling. This is what made this wedding a “momentous” one, a
synecdoche of the “global moment.”
With respect to “mind,” I must begin with the only critical commentator on the scene, an American woman, a professor of Indian languages, who drove those around her to distraction by compulsively
commenting on everything in the ritual that was “wrong:” the translation was wrong, the sequence of rites was wrong, the organizing of
space was wrong, it wasn’t the way her Pandit had explained it to her,
ad irritatum. She was an insufferable repository of theoretical knowledge, religious to the core, reminding me of the anthropologist I was
twenty-five years ago. Even without the professor there was a surfeit
of mind in New Jersey. By mind I include the impulse to reason and to
generalize — to theorize. The feasting and dancing half of the wedding
was seen as distinct and separate from the ritual half, the solemnizing
half. And what was the reaction to the solemn half? Many of the young
Indians thought it was a learning experience. No surprise in that. The
priest was hell-bent on teaching, preaching, and making the ritual
practices explanatorily intelligible as if the lives of the couple and the
young members of the audience — Indian American and non-Indian
American — depended on it. They were both equally concerned with
representations and their meanings. As one group of youngsters, all
Wall Street success stories, told me: “The symbolism was neat” and “It
is great to know what all this means.” An American friend chimed in,
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“It is great to know other belief systems.” “We are getting to know our
parents’ belief system,” echoed another in the group. Everyone agreed.
If one considers learning as the way an organism makes its environment habitable, then in this mind-dominated mode of learning, the
cultivation of a way of seeing the world becomes the dominant way of
making one’s environment habitable, the dominant way of being in the
world.6 “Knowing about” becomes the only way to know.7 The
approach of the anthropologist, the student of comparative religion,
and the Orientalist, is reenacted in such global moments. It is assumed
that to know a people or a culture is to know about their “beliefs.” It is
based on a theological assumption that all human actions are expressions of beliefs; to know cultures is to have knowledge about the
beliefs of these cultures. Through one’s belief one acquires a worldview. Again, nota bene the optic in worldview. The root model for this
way of being in the world is — even in its incarnation as science — religion.8
Don’t get me wrong. I am not saying that there is no learning
involved in the weddings I witnessed in South India, but the manner
of making one’s way in the world, of making one’s environment habitable, wasn’t dominated by “learning about.” Learning through beingin-the-world, learning ontologically, entails more than a way of seeing
the world, or learning epistemically. It is not that representations were
not involved in the total context of the 1974 Tamil wedding, but that
the individual was not a mere observer, one who looked at and, if adequately educated, looked through representations — be they icons,
indexes, or symbols — as if they were mirrors that would reflect a further reality. For every participant himself or herself was a representation, a sign. “Man [sic] is a symbol,” Peirce wrote.9 What one has here,
then, is not a cogito or an agent in a world of representations or signs,
decoding, interpreting, and explaining them, but rather, men and
women who are themselves signs and therefore immersed in a semeiotic ontology, a semeiotic being-in-the-world. In such a world, what is
important is not how well one makes mental representations of what is
“really going on,” but rather how one as a sign among signs finds
one’s niche, one’s place, one’s angle of repose or the direction of flow.
And this calls for more than a theoretical knowledge of what signs in
ritual mean or even what the world is. It is even more than knowing
what ritual signs do. It entails knowing one’s place among signs, ritual
signs included. This entails more than knowing the world through seeing the world; it calls for knowing the world through a more compre-
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hensive being-in-the-world, which the very notion of religion can only
partially accommodate.
Over thirty-three years ago, Clifford Geertz wrote a much-celebrated and widely reprinted essay called, “Religion as a Cultural System.” He starts the essay with a very economical and elegant definition
of religion and then goes on to parse the definition in the rest of his
essay. It is a definition that has been thoroughly informed by the history of definition writing and has done the finest job of filtering all the
problematic dross of earlier attempts. “Religion,” he wrote:
is a system of symbols which act to establish powerful, pervasive and
long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating concepts of a
general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an
aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.10

Talal Asad revisited this essay a few years ago and has subjected it to a
brilliant critique pointing out, among other things, that: “It is not mere
symbols that implant true Christian dispositions, but power. . . . It was
not the mind that moved spontaneously to religious truth, but power
that created the conditions for experiencing that truth.”11
Quite apart from the denial of the dimensions of power by a symbolic understanding of religion, I wish to draw attention to the curious
fact that Geertz’s definition of religion could serve as well for a definition of culture. Correspondingly, were we to consider Durkheim’s definition of the sacred, it would coincide with his definition of society.
These coincidences are not accidental. For both in Christianity and in
Western culture as a whole, the symbolic dominates. Symbols stand
for something else; symbols are about something other than themselves. The better the symbols, the truer their representations. Christianity has always been about the truth in representations and,
conversely, about false representations. Hindus, in their multitude of
practices, are not concerned with truth in this representational form.
The same goes for Buddhists, Jains, Shintoists, Taoists, or for that matter, for what goes under the label of Native American “religions.” If
the symbolic dominates religion and Western culture as a whole, it has
also rendered performatives as symbolic, and wrongly interprets
cultures where the performative is the norm by using “alien,” meaning-laden symbolic standards. Thus, for Durkheim and most anthropological analysts, ritual is a symbol. In India, the symbol itself may be
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experienced as a performative, thus transforming the symbol into a ritual. Ritual refers not to the performance of acts that instantiate practical knowledge, but to the performance of recursive acts.
Balagangadhara observes that, “the social environment created in such
a culture will itself be recursive, exhibiting the properties of recursive
systems.”12 In recursive systems, the mood matters more than the
moment. In non-recursive systems, it is the moment that matters and
those who are in such a system must perforce be mindful of the
moment. The New Jersey wedding was such a moment of mindfulness
in which the mood was oxymoronically uncertain.
II. “Buddhist” “Belief”
Now, let me shift from India and Hindu New Jersey to Sri Lanka and
Buddhism. If the making of Hinduism has been a long drawn — and
still unfinished — affair, the making of Buddhism happened quite
swiftly, within a span of seventy years. The best book to date on the
making of Buddhism is Phillip Almond’s, The British Discovery of Buddhism. For an ethnographic understanding of the persistence of the
unique formation of Sinhala Buddhism—with its split into textual and
popular forms, great and little traditions — David Scott’s brilliant book
is indispensable reading. This split is both a colonial product and an
anthropological object.
The great Indian historian Romila Thapar holds that the constructions of Buddhism and Hinduism are no older than 200 years.13
According to Almond, Buddhism is a nineteenth-century religion. It
was first discovered as a religion “out there” in the Orient as part of
the heathen Other. But it was rediscovered in the Orientalist present as
a theorizable object, which was located in the West. This relocation
came about:
through the progressive collection, translation, and the publication of its
textual past. Buddhism, by 1860, had come to exist, not in the Orient, but
in the Oriental libraries and institutes of the West, in its texts and manuscripts, at the desks of the Western savants who interpreted it. By the
middle of the century, the Buddhism that existed ‘out there’ was beginning to be judged by a West that alone knew what Buddhism was, is, and
ought to be. The essence of Buddhism came to be seen as expressed not
‘out there’ in the Orient, but in the West through the West’s control of
Buddhism’s own textual past.14
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Even more specifically, David Scott argues that “the conception of
Buddhism as one ‘religion’ (buddhagama) among other ‘religions’ (agamas) — distinctive yet related to them in being identifiable as of the
same genre of discourse — does not appear to predate the British missionary encounter with the Sinhalas.”15 Furthermore, the West had discovered not one Buddhism, but two: philosophical Buddhism and
popular Buddhism. This is a distinction that has lasted to this very
day.
Buddhism, as practiced in the East, “compared unfavorably with its
ideal textual exemplifications contained in the libraries, universities,
colonial offices, and missionary societies of the West.”16 Popular Buddhism was portrayed as a betrayal of Asia’s Martin Luther, Gautama
Buddha, who had attempted to dislodge “the superstitions and rituals
with which the Brahman priesthood had enshrouded India, [and take]
religion back to its simple and pure origins.” This was a view to which
Max Muller had given broad currency.17 In the dichotomized form of
Sri Lankan religion, textual Buddhism measured up to being a true (or
truer) religion because it could be understood “in terms of ‘doctrine’
(supposedly ‘what the Buddha taught’). [I]t was only natural that
[true] Buddhists were taken by Western observers to be those who
could be said to ‘believe’ in . . . the propositions of that doctrine.”18
Those who fell short of this call to believe were degraded to “animism,” another, lesser form of religion.
In Sri Lanka, Buddhism congeals into a religion in the nineteenth
century as part of a wave of “reform movements” that swept over
South Asia. In India, Ram Mohan Roy (1772 – 1833) founded the
Brahmo Samaj, Dayananda Sarasvati (1824 – 1883) founded the Arya
Samaj in 1875, and Narendranath Datta (1863 – 1902), better known as
Vivekananda, founded the Ramakrishna Mission in 1897. In Sri Lanka,
the leading reformer was Anagarika Dharmapala (1864 – 1933). Strict
etymology notwithstanding, “Reformation,” used in a religious context, does not carry the connotation of something being formed anew
or even an improvement on the existing state of affairs. Rather, ever
since Luther, “reformation” has implied returning to a better original.
In fact, however, the so-called reformation movements in India and Sri
Lanka were reactive responses to the challenge of Christianity. Much
that was formed in the nineteenth century in Buddhism and Hinduism19 was not so much a renewal or restoration but the making of
something that was totally new — even though the Sri Lankan Bud-
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dhist reformer emphasized the point that his movement was not so
much a reform movement as a renaissance.
These South Asian reformers were baited, as it were, into accepting
a challenge thrown out by the Christian missionaries, a challenge to
play a very serious game. This game was called “religion.” In Sri
Lanka, one of the forms in which this game played itself out was
through public debates. These debates had been staged since the mid1840s. As might be expected, initially the South Asians faced a stacked
deck. The rules of the game were Christian. The game itself was Christian. And in general, the missionaries had used their debating skills to
overwhelm some diffident and not very erudite representatives of the
indigenous traditions.20 The verbal confrontations, purportedly
intended to critically examine the tenets of Buddhism and Christianity,
would end up demonstrating to the audience gathered for the occasion
the superiority of Christianity. By the 1860s, the balance shifted. By all
accounts, the Buddhists were beginning to gain the upper hand in
debate. In a series of five debates between 1865 and 1873, a very erudite monk by the name of Migettuvatte Gunanada established himself
as the “terror of the missionaries.” The Christians may have well lost
the debate but they founded another religion called Buddhism, no
longer a radical Other but another of the same, a religious rival, a member of the club of religions. In fact, the West had founded two religions:
philosophical Buddhism and folk Buddhism — a distinction that paralleled the one made for Hinduism between textual tradition and popular Hinduism. It is a distinction that lasts to this very day. On the part
of the Sri Lankan Buddhist reformers, they, too, no longer confronted a
radical Other whom they could treat with indifference, but a religious
rival. To quote the young Indo-American man at the New Jersey
Hindu wedding, they came to know another “belief system,” they
came to know “what all this means.” Some might have even found that
“the symbolism was neat.”
Anagarika Dharmapala was as complex as he was brilliant. His
brand of renaissance Buddhism heralded many changes the effects of
which—some good, some bad, some intended, some not—are with us
to this day. In general, he sowed the wind and we reap the whirlwind.
The nationalism which was born with the Buddhist reformation
helped Sri Lanka throw out the colonizer but also helped usher in Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism and its ugly antidote, Tamil Tigerism. One
particular change that Anagarika Dharmapala brought about concerns
a Buddhist institution called the dharmadesana.
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Dharmadesana is often translated as the Buddhist sermon. At first
blush, from a Christian (especially Protestant) point of view, as a “sermon,” it would appear to stand in favorable contrast to Hindu (mindless) ritual. A sermon, it would seem, is always about something.
Remember, it is this “aboutness,” this provision of a model of the cosmos that distinguishes the Semitic religions in general and Christianity
in particular. But the way in which the dharmadesana was practiced in
pre-“reformation” times in Sri Lanka (and is still practiced in certain
quarters of the island) was anything but sermon-like, if a sermon is
thought of as an expository, even edificational, holding-forth. H. L.
Seneviratne, who devotes almost a chapter to the subject, remarks that
the doctrinal content of the dharmadesana was insignificant. It consisted
of the following sequence:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

The arrival of the preacher
Giving merit for the dharmasana, first time
The invitation to preach, in gatha and prasa (verses)
Giving merit for the dharmasana, second time
Invitation to the gods
Verses of namaskara
Prasa on benefits of hearing bana, lullabically
Benefits of bana, second time, in a different literary mode
The sutra
Commentary
Maitrivarnana
Giving of merit
Giving to the preacher

Seneviratne continues:
A look at this sequence makes it clear that the doctrinal content is limited
to the core of the sutra and the commentary. Even there the sutra is not
understood, because it is in Pali. Even the commentary may well be in
another text, Pali or Sinhala, which is also memorized by the preacher
and chanted. The appeal of this was more poetic or musical within an
overall stricture of religious emotion. It is possible that some preachers
improvised and got across to the more educated or more intellectually
inclined listeners some of the doctrinal content. But for the majority the
sound was the message, the act of hearing itself being understood as
generative of merit. This is brought out by the emphasis made in the
quoted passage to the importance of the voice, its melodic quality, and
the lullabic element. . . . There is the idea of performance.21
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Now Seneviratne himself is an anthropologist at the University of Virginia, trained in the great tradition of Marx and Durkheim, and who
adores Weber and idolizes the Protestant Ethic. As I continue to cite
him you will see that his own biases lie with the “essence of religion,”
in the reasonable, which is to be found in the textual tradition understood by the reflective few, not among “ordinary people” and “folk”
practices.
The author uses the term pavatvanava to mean delivery of the sermon, a
term suggestive more of a performance than an exposition of doctrinal
concepts. What we see here is the kind of elementary rendering of the
religion into aesthetic performance which was encouraged and did
achieve its fullest development in Hinduism (music and dance), but discouraged by the Theravada orthodoxy. The evolution of dramatic forms
was more successful in the folk healing rituals where the orthodoxy had
no say. For ordinary people however this ceremonialism, and not any
abstruse doctrines, constituted the essence of religion.22
This new dharmadesana was a radical departure from the traditional. It
was confined to about one hour, a remarkable shrinkage into one twelfth
of its original duration. Next, it was free of the elaborate ritualism that
conferred on the traditional dharmadesana most of its length. It was not a
performance in the same sense as the traditional one was, and lacked the
dramatic elements we noted in it. Above all it focused on a theme, a feature structurally integrated to the sermon in the form of a Pali verse that
the preacher chanted explicitly recognizing it as the theme (matrka).
While there are some precedents for this in the mediaeval Sinhala literary works which were essentially dharmadesana in written form, the new
dharmadesana in its succinctness and unity resembled more the sermon
that emanated from the Christian pulpit, like the ones which the young
Dharmapala heard over and over again at the corrugated metal roofed
hall in Keyser Street.23

III. Kataragama: A Momentous Shift from Mood to Mind
There is a place called Kataragama in the south of Sri Lanka. Its reigning deity was Skanda, one of the sons of Shiva. When I was a child I
visited the temple of Skanda. It was a place for ritual, possession, passion, and trance. Mood was everything. The body was involved in
worship: it was pierced, it swung from hooks, and it bore heavy burdens called kavadi. There were no sermons. There was no one to tell
you what it was all about. The devotees were Sinhalas and Tamils.

187

Macalester International

Vol. 8

There were no Hindus to be contrasted with Buddhists. Even though it
was a quarter of a century after Anagarika Dharmapala’s death, it was
a time when Hindus worshipped the Buddha and Buddhists worshipped deities of the Hindu pantheon. I was the only observer. I was
an eleven-year-old Christian voyeur. I had accompanied some of my
non-Christian Sinhala and Tamil school friends. I had come secretly,
without my parent’s permission, to watch the heathens go into ecstasy.
Since the outbreak of the Sinhala-Tamil civil war in 1983, Buddhist
Sinhalas have begun to claim the shrine as Buddhist (meaning, not
Tamil/Hindu). A certain “sanitization” of Kataragama has begun. Sinhalese and Tamil pilgrims realize that something momentous is happening. The nation has entered Kataragama and so has religion. When
I visited Kataragama again in 1994, I noticed that the mood of the place
was changing. It had become mindful of nation and mindful of religion. It had also become mindful of symbol. I picked up a booklet,
written for the English-speaking tourist, which began a symbolic
explanation of certain rituals with the words: “In the Buddhist and
Hindu worldview . . . ” I strongly suspect that the anonymous author
had had some anthropological training. Religion and worldview produce a specific kind of knowledge, viz., theoretical knowledge. And
Balagangadhara is right when he observes that “the necessity and
indispensability of world views is the secularized version of a theological belief.”24 Anthropologists who look for a people’s or a culture’s
worldview in order to tell it apart from another people’s or culture’s
worldview, are merely religionists in another guise. Does one need a
worldview to find one’s way in the world? Does one need a religion?
The pilgrims at Kataragama did not seem to think so — at least not in
1968. Times have changed. On the day of my visit in 1994, there were
signs of a storm in the sky. But the real concern in my group of pilgrims was of a different kind of storm, the eye of which was religious
nationalism. It was a time for suicide bombers and true believers, and
it seemed like something momentous could happen without warning.
The moment, though on a far more ominous note, seemed as uncertain
as the moment that was, in New Jersey, called a “Hindu” wedding.
The word was out that one must at least have a point of view if not a
worldview. The question is: must all other ways of being in the world
sooner or later be arrogated by the blind spot of religion? This, I
believe, is the question for this global moment.
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Notes
1. E. Valentine Daniel, Charred Lullabies: Chapters in an Anthropology of Violence (1996),
Chapter 4.
2. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande (1937), 81.
3. S. N. Balagangadhara, ‘The Heathen in His Blindness...:’ Asia, the West and the Dynamic of
Religion (1994), 56.
4. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100 –
600), Vol. I (1971), 39.
5. For the reader who persists in wanting to know more, a good introduction to Peirce’s
categories may be found in Carl R. Hausman (1993), 9 – 14. You may also read C. S.
Peirce, 1.23 – 26. (In keeping with convention in citing from The Collected Works of Charles
Sander Peirce, the number to the left of the decimal point indicates the volume and to the
right indicates paragraph.)
6. For a detailed discussion of the distinction between being and seeing, see Daniel, 43–71.
7. See Balagangadhara, 447 – 50, for a discussion of knowing as “knowing about.”
“Knowing about” corresponds to the “epistemic” or “seeing” in contradistinction to the
“ontic” or “being” in my usage, for which, see Daniel, 43–71.
8. Balagangadhara, 451.
9. C. S. Peirce, 7.583.
10. Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” Interpretation of Cultures (1973), 90.
11. Talal Asad, “Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,”
Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (1993), 35.
12. Balagangadhara, 465.
13. Romila Thapar, “Imagined Religious Communities?,” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 2
(1989): 209 – 230 (from page 38 in Seneviratne).
Philip C. Almond, The British Discovery of Buddhism (1988), 12–13.
David Scott, Formations of Ritual: Colonial and Anthropological Discourses on Sinhala Yaktovil (1994), 187 – 188.
16. Almond, 37.
17. Christopher Clausen, “Victorian Buddhism and the Origin of Comparative Religion,”
Religion 5, no. 1 (1975): 7.
18. Scott, 188.
19. David Scott holds that the genealogies of the Buddhist and Hindu “religions” are
somewhat different. Buddhism, he argues, owes much of its formative moments to the
impact of Victorian Evangelicalism, and Hinduism carries with it the formative aura of
Orientalism.
20. K. M. de Silva, A History of Sri Lanka (1981), 340.
21. H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings (2000), 74–76.
22. Ibid., 76.
23. Ibid., 80 – 81.
24. Balagangadhara, 429.
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